In January 2026, TotalEnergies lifted force majeure on the Mozambique LNG project at Afungi, ending a suspension that began in April 2021 following jihadist attacks in Moc•mboa da Praia. By February, construction machinery was moving again and ENR confirmed the restart of a $20 billion build that had been frozen for nearly five years. For supply chain and procurement teams in Mozambique's energy sector, this is the signal they've been waiting for. But it comes with complications that anyone planning logistics to northern Mozambique needs to understand before they start booking cargo.

The restart is real, but don't treat it as a clean slate

TotalEnergies' full lifting of force majeure and the confirmed construction restart are significant milestones. The project's financing, backed by export credit agencies including the US Export-Import Bank, remained in place through the suspension period, and partners including Mitsui, ONGC Videsh, ENH, and TotalEnergies itself have committed additional equity to keep it viable.

Upstream Online reported in early March that TotalEnergies is already in the market for key Mozambique LNG services, meaning procurement and contracting activity is actively accelerating. For logistics operators and suppliers, this is the beginning of a sustained ramp-up in cargo volume heading north, not a one-off mobilisation event.

That said, the conditions on the ground are materially different from those in 2019 when the project was originally mobilising. Infrastructure built before the suspension has degraded. The workforce pipeline needs to be rebuilt. And the security environment, while improved, remains fragile in ways that directly affect logistics planning.

Security: the constraint that shapes everything else

This week, Bloomberg reported that Rwanda, which has had troops stationed in Cabo Delgado since 2021 providing security cover for the Afungi site, has warned it may withdraw. This is not an academic concern. Rwandan and SADC forces have been the primary reason Afungi remained accessible at all through the suspension period, and any change to that arrangement would have immediate implications for how quickly site access can be scaled.

Separately, a Bloomberg analysis published on 13 March flagged that at least one Mozambique gas project is facing collateral damage from US sanctions, a situation that adds complexity to project finance and contracting structures, particularly for US-backed entities working in the region.

For logistics planners, the security picture means two things. First, route security for road legs into Afungi remains contingent on forces outside any commercial party's control. Second, sea freight routes, which bypass the most sensitive land corridors, become an even more attractive option from a risk management perspective.

What logistics demand actually looks like right now

The first phase of a restart like this is always about mobilisation: getting equipment, camp infrastructure, and construction materials to site. The second phase is about sustaining operations, reefer cargo for catering and perishables, spare parts, consumables, PPE, and project freight in formats ranging from standard containers to out-of-gauge loads.

The Afungi site has very limited road access from the south. Palma, the nearest town with a meaningful road connection, is still recovering from the 2021 attack. The road from Pemba to Afungi runs through contested territory. For anything time-sensitive or requiring a predictable delivery schedule, sea freight from South Africa is the credible option. Road haulage from Johannesburg to Afungi covers approximately 2,700 km through multiple border crossings, is subject to convoy scheduling requirements in some stretches, and has meaningfully higher transit variability than a scheduled coastal service.

The cost differential is not always in sea freight's favour on a per-unit basis, particularly for small, urgent shipments where road can move faster on a short notice. But for consolidated loads of 20+ tonnes, reefer requirements, or any cargo that benefits from predictable bi-weekly scheduling rather than ad hoc trucking, sea freight becomes the operationally superior choice.

What this means if you're procuring logistics for Afungi right now

A few practical observations for procurement and logistics coordinators starting to plan volumes for the 2026 ramp-up:

Book early, and think in waves. The restart is real, but it is also happening across multiple contractors, sub-contractors, and service providers simultaneously. Space on any scheduled coastal service will tighten as mobilisation intensifies through Q2 2026. Getting cargo requirements on record now, even provisionally, gives operators time to plan vessel capacity.

Plan reefer requirements explicitly. Camp catering for a site of Afungi's eventual scale is not a minor logistics line item. Reefer capacity on coastal routes is limited. If you have cold chain requirements, these need to be confirmed well ahead of the first delivery date, not treated as plug-in capacity available on demand.

Understand the Rwanda situation before finalising road-heavy plans. If your logistics model relies on significant road movement through the Palma corridor, the Rwanda troop situation warrants monitoring. Contingency planning for alternative modes or routes is not pessimistic, it is standard project risk management.

Local content is a live issue. The Mozambican oil industry's withdrawal from the London Africa Energies Summit this week is a symptom of a broader tension between international operators and local content expectations. Procurement teams sourcing logistics services should expect this to become a more active compliance area in Mozambique over the next 12•24 months.

Key Takeaways

  • Construction at Afungi is resuming and procurement activity is accelerating, logistics demand will ramp materially through Q2•Q3 2026, and early capacity planning is critical.
  • The Rwanda troop warning and ongoing security complexity make sea freight the lower-risk logistics mode for predictable, scheduled cargo to Afungi compared to road-heavy options through the Palma corridor.
  • Reefer capacity, bi-weekly scheduling, and last-mile delivery from port to camp are the three variables procurement teams most consistently underplan for Afungi operations, address them before mobilisation begins, not during it.

Sources referenced:
TotalEnergies press release, January 2026 (force majeure lift); ENR, February 2026 (construction restart); Bloomberg, 14 March 2026 (Rwanda troop warning); Bloomberg, 13 March 2026 (US sanctions impact); Upstream Online, 9 March 2026 (TotalEnergies LNG services tender); Africa Intelligence, 11 March 2026 (Afungi operational challenges); African Energy Chamber, 16 March 2026 (local content summit withdrawal).