Rwanda's Warning and What It Means for Supply Chain Resilience at Afungi

Last week Bloomberg reported that Rwanda has warned it may withdraw its Joint Task Force from Cabo Delgado province. The same week, Mozambique's Armed Defence Forces Commander visited the Rwandan JTF headquarters in Moc•mboa da Praia, a signal that both sides are managing the relationship carefully. But the warning itself is out in the open, and it has implications that procurement and logistics teams cannot ignore.

The Rwandan forces, deployed since July 2021, are the primary reason the Afungi peninsula is accessible to contractors and logistics operators at all. Without them, or without a credible replacement, TotalEnergies' ability to mobilise the 4,000-strong workforce currently on site becomes a very different calculation. And if workforce mobilisation becomes uncertain, cargo logistics follows immediately.

Why Security Is a Direct Logistics Variable

For most supply chains, security is a risk category on a risk register. At Afungi, it is an operational prerequisite. The peninsula is geographically isolated, road access from the south runs through territory that was contested by insurgents as recently as 2021, and the last-mile delivery environment around Moc•mboa da Praia and Afungi itself requires active security clearance for movement. Vessel access to Afungi's offshore anchorage and the NAMALAPA logistics base operates within security corridors that exist because Rwandan and Mozambican forces hold the ground.

This is not theoretical. In March 2021, Palma, 10 kilometres from the Afungi site, was attacked. TotalEnergies declared force majeure and suspended construction within days. The suspension lasted nearly five years. It cost the project an estimated $2•3 billion in standby costs, contract renegotiations, and delay damages. First LNG production, originally targeted for 2024, is now pencilled in for 2029.

When security windows close, supply chains don't pause gracefully, they snap. Every purchase order, every charter arrangement, every import permit that assumed access becomes a problem simultaneously.

What the Rwanda Warning Actually Signals

Rwanda's warning is almost certainly a negotiating signal rather than an imminent operational decision. Kigali has a strong interest in the deployment continuing, the force enhances Rwanda's diplomatic standing and generates revenue, and neither Rwanda nor Mozambique wants to create conditions that undermine a $20 billion project that both have an interest in succeeding.

But the warning is still significant for logistics planners for two reasons. First, it confirms that the security arrangement is transactional and subject to renegotiation, not a permanent fixture. Second, it introduces a visible uncertainty into what procurement timelines are built on. If your Q2 or Q3 cargo plan assumes unrestricted Afungi access, you now have a named risk that may not have been on your radar a month ago.

The FADM commander's visit to the Rwanda JTF on March 11, briefed on operational security and discussing coordination, suggests the machinery of security cooperation is functioning. But the public warning has done its job: it's in the market.

Sea Freight vs. Road: Different Risk Profiles

For logistics operators, the mode of transport shapes how security risk translates into operational exposure. Road freight from South Africa to northern Mozambique, a journey of roughly 2,500 to 3,000 km depending on the route, passes through multiple security checkpoints, provincial borders, and stretches of road that are difficult to control in periods of instability. The N380 and connecting routes through Nampula and Cabo Delgado are not trivial risk corridors. In periods of elevated insecurity, road haulage simply stops. It is also the mode most vulnerable to diversion, theft, and ambush in a contested environment.

Sea freight to Afungi operates differently. Vessel access to the offshore anchorage is managed through a defined channel, and the cabotage route from South African ports to Afungi does not traverse the same ground-level risk. That said, sea freight is not immune: if the Afungi site itself becomes inaccessible, or if anchorage clearance is suspended, vessels have limited options. The key difference is that sea freight can hold position offshore, can reroute to Pemba for transshipment, and is not exposed to the same point-of-road ambush risk that makes road freight so vulnerable in unstable corridors.

In practical terms, a period of elevated security uncertainty is a stronger argument for sea freight than for road, particularly for high-value cargo, reefer shipments, and oversized project items where road alternatives are already constrained.

Practical Steps for Procurement Teams

If you're planning cargo to Afungi in Q2 or Q3 2026, the Rwanda situation warrants a specific review of your assumptions. That review doesn't need to be dramatic, the probability of a full security collapse is low and the mechanisms for maintaining continuity are functioning. But it does mean building explicit contingency into your plans, not just relying on baseline assumptions.

A few practical considerations:

• Review buffer stock levels. If your site or camp supply is running lean in anticipation of steady resupply, the current security environment is a reason to add a week or two of buffer. The marginal cost of carrying extra stock is much lower than the cost of a supply disruption during a security window closure.
• Confirm last-mile access assumptions with your logistics provider. "Delivered to Afungi" can mean different things depending on who controls the last 10km. Make sure your operator has current ground truth on access conditions.
• Identify your Pemba fallback. If Afungi access is temporarily restricted, Pemba is the staging point. Know where your cargo sits, who handles it, and what the rebooking cost looks like.
• Don't let sanctioned-entity risk slip through procurement. The US sanctions story from March 13 is a reminder that the web of sanctions affecting Mozambique-adjacent entities is complex and changes fast. Make sure your supplier screening is current, a counterparty that was clean six months ago may not be now.
• Use scheduled, regular services where possible. Ad-hoc chartering in a high-uncertainty environment is expensive and unreliable. Bi-weekly scheduled services maintain market presence and pricing discipline in ways that spot charters cannot.

The Broader Context: A Project That Cannot Afford Another Suspension

TotalEnergies and its partners have committed to a restart. The project has $4.7 billion in US EXIM financing reauthorised under the Trump administration, it has 4,000 workers on site, and it has a 2029 production target that is already five years behind the original schedule. Another suspension, even a short one, would be extraordinarily costly and would likely trigger fresh financing and insurance reviews.

That pressure is precisely why the security arrangements will not be allowed to collapse without a replacement. If Rwanda scales back, the expectation is that Mozambican forces with SADC support will cover the gap. The mechanism exists. But the transition period, if one occurs, is when logistics teams need to be most careful about their assumptions.

Plan for continuity, build in contingency, and stay close to your logistics provider's ground intelligence. The project will proceed. The supply chain needs to be ready for the bumps along the way.

WFL operates bi-weekly sea freight from South Africa to Afungi. If you're planning cargo movements to the Afungi LNG site and want to discuss contingency logistics or scheduled service options, contact our team.